I. BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a written plea agreement (Ct. Rec. 107), Defendant pled guilty to Count 2 of a superseding indictment charging him with Distribution Of A Mixture Or Substance Containing Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §2. He was sentenced on October 18, 2007 to a term of imprisonment of eight months and to a three year term of supervised release. (Ct. Rec. 126). Although Defendant apparently has completed the term of imprisonment, the fact he is on supervised release satisfies the "custody" requirement for bringing a §2255 motion. *United States v. Monreal*, 301 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendant contends his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in that he failed to advise the Defendant of the consequences of a conviction (i.e., deportation) such that Defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant must prove: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) movant was prejudiced by such deficiency. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). As to the first prong, there is a strong presumption counsel's performance was sufficiently effective. *Id.* at 689. Defendant must show his counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." *Id.* at 690. As to the second prong, Defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (i.e., a guilty plea would not have been entered). A "reasonable probability" is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the proceedings. *Id.* at 694.

ORDER DENYING §2255 MOTION- A guilty plea must be a knowing and intelligent act performed with

1 sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. In 2 3 4

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order for a criminal defendant to make an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty, it is incumbent upon counsel to provide his client with necessary and accurate information. A mere inaccurate prediction, standing alone, will not constitute ineffective assistance, but "gross mischaracterization" of the likely outcome presented by a case, along with "erroneous advice" falls below the level of competence required of defense attorneys. *Iaea v. Sunn*, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986). An attorney's failure to advise a client of the immigration consequences of a

conviction, without more, does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). This is because deportation is a collateral consequence, not a direct consequence of the criminal process. Id., citing Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1988), and Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976). Where, however, counsel has not merely failed to inform, but has effectively misled, his client about the immigration consequences of a conviction, counsel's performance is objectively unreasonable under contemporary standards for attorney competence. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows Defendant's counsel neither failed to inform or effectively misled the Defendant that deportation was a potential, indeed probable, consequence of his conviction. During the change of plea hearing before the Honorable Robert H. Whaley, Defendant's counsel specifically advised the court that Defendant was not a U.S. citizen and that he had told the Defendant this would "probably impact" his ability to stay in the United States and would "probably" result in him being deported. Judge Whaley agreed with that

assessment and asked the Defendant if he understood this. The Defendant responded affirmatively. (Ct. Rec. 146 at p. 13).

The balance of the plea colloquy between Judge Whaley and the Defendant clearly establishes that Defendant's plea of guilty was knowing and voluntary. In his own words, the Defendant stated that he had drugs on his person and sold them to another individual in order to make money to buy more drugs for his personal use. Asked by Judge Whaley whether had sold drugs to an undercover agent for money and knew it was cocaine, the Defendant responded affirmatively. (Ct. Rec. 146 at pp. 13-14).

Despite Defendant's conviction, through the efforts of his counsel, the Defendant received a very favorable plea agreement which ultimately resulted in him receiving a term of only eight months imprisonment on a charge carrying a statutory maximum of 20 years imprisonment. Accordingly, the court finds the performance of Defendant's counsel was not objectively deficient and he did not render ineffective assistance to the Defendant.

17 III. CONCLUSION

It "plainly" appears from the face of the §2255 motion and the prior proceedings in the case that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Therefore, it is not necessary to direct the United States to file an answer to the motion and it is not necessary to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

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ORDER DENYING §2255 MOTION-

Defendant's "Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. §2255" (Ct. Rec. 145) is **DENIED**. IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide copies to Defendant and to counsel for the United States. **DATED** this 17th day of April, 2008. s/Lonny R. Suko LONNY R. SUKO United States District Judge **ORDER DENYING §2255 MOTION-**